The 27-page report released by the non-partisan Congressional Research Service (CRS), an arm of the Library of Congress, notes: “Since 1991, Beijing has taken steps to address U.S. and other countries’ concerns by increasing its partial participation in international nonproliferation regimes and issuing export control regulations. However, questions have remained.”

As recently as Jan. 29, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation John S. Wolf voiced his concerns over the mainland’s patchy record, describing “parts” of Beijing’s record as “quite good,” but stating that the Bush administration remains “concerned” about the effectiveness of the mainland’s export control mechanisms.

Besides aiding North Korea with the development of its nuclear weapons program, the mainland is accused of supplying weapons technology to Pakistan, Iran, Libya and Syria. “The vicious attacks of September 11, 2001, added a compelling U.S. interest in considering U.S. policy on PRC weapons proliferation,” states the report.

While Beijing has stated that it has “no intention of assisting any other country in developing ballistic missiles that can be used to deliver nuclear weapons,” according to the report, the country declined to join 93 other nations in signing the International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation at the Hague on Nov. 25, 2002.

Please see HIGHLIGHTS on page

The report also draws attention to the conflicting and “unreliable” messages coming from Beijing about its commitment to curbing proliferation from within mainland China’s borders. While in public at the United Nations Beijing condemned nuclear weapons tests conducted by Pakistan in May 1998 in response to similar tests conducted by India, “China, as Pakistan’s principal military supplier, failed to avert the tests and has not cut off nuclear aid,” states the report.

Again, in 1998, mainland President Jiang Zemin “pledged to cease supply of cruise missiles” to Iran, according to the report. The president’s pledge apparently went unfulfilled, for in May 2002, the Bush administration imposed sanctions on eight PRC entities, under the 2000 Iran Nonproliferation Act, for transfers of cruise missile components to Iran.

The mainland has also been implicated in transfers of technology to Iran for use in the production of chemical weapons, for which Beijing was penalized in July of 2002 under the 1992 Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act, according to the report.

While the report notes that so far President George W. Bush is “pleased” with the mainland’s cooperation in handling the crisis over North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, the degree of this cooperation demonstrates that Beijing has lingering concerns about the impact of such cooperation with the U.S.

Beijing, fearing an influx of North Korean refugees and the loss of a buffer between mainland and U.S. forces, appears to indicate a “preference for international sustainment of the North Korean regime rather than collapse,” notes the report. Beijing also fears losing international standing should it appear to have limited influence over Pyongyang, and also remains unclear whether “support for Washington would result in limits in U.S. security assistance to Taiwan,” according to the report. Washington in turn has been

accused by Beijing of a form of proliferation for supplying Taiwan with military know-how and hardware. An accusation the U.S. has defended citing its obligation, under the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), to provide Taiwan with the means to defend itself.

Regardless of Washington’s protestations, Beijing maintains an overtly hostile posture toward Taiwan and continues its military modernization at a seemingly ever-increasing pace. This is evidenced by a report in the March issue of Arms Control Today which notes that the mainland will soon begin to receive the first of 38 Su-30MKK fighter jets from Russia, the third such batch received since 1999.

While stating, that “some (U.S.) officials and experts cite PRC nonproliferation statements as signs that the United States has made progress in nonproliferation goals,” the report goes on to note: “Some also say that U.S. sanctions are counterproductive and are too broad,” and that perhaps the U.S. should assist Beijing in recognizing the need for nonproliferation for “its own national interests” and to assist them to “develop stronger export controls.”

“No matter what options are pursued, many argue that U.S. leadership and a forward-looking and credible strategy are need for dealing with China’s rising influence in world affairs,” states the report.