We need to ask how much U.S. intervention in various conflict situations promotes peace, and what might be achievable in such hot spots as Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Palestine and North Korea. The answers are so elusive that the only certainty is the extraordinary degree of uncertainty in any course of action the United States might take.

Afghanistan is the thorniest problem at the moment because the issue is the use of force to build a nation that is not worthy of that name. Afghanistan is not a functioning state, but a hodgepodge of tribes with a more or less mythical government led by a corrupt president who stole an election by massive fraud. Hamid Karzai is likely to win again in the runoff that has been forced upon him.

If the American generals seeking 40,000 more U.S. troops think that a Karzai victory will legitimatize him beyond his corrupt circle, they are dreaming. The U.S. and other NATO countries have been supporting Karzai for years in the hopes that he would spark moderates to defend their right to be governed by other than Taliban extremists. This is not happening, despite the massive buildup in U.S. troop presence since the beginning of 2008.

In his last year in office, President Bush almost doubled U.S. forces in Afghanistan, from a little more than 26,000 to more than 48,000. President Obama added to that surge with another 20,000 troops this year. Now the generals who last year said the first surge would accomplish the mission are telling the world we are losing. General McCrystal, the U.S. commander, asserts that 40,000 more troops are necessary to defeat the Taliban insurgency; without them the mission will fail.

This sounds much like General Westmoreland during the Vietnam War. He maintained that more U.S. troops would certainly prevail in a war of attrition, but 535,000 of them could not sustain a corrupt South Vietnam against a determined adversary from the North. With fraud so widespread in the recent Afghan elections that we pressured President Karzai to accept a runoff, we should be asking whether the U.S.-led effort in Afghanistan is not on behalf of a government that has less legitimacy, authority or competence than the Saigon government we shed so much blood to support a generation ago.

History should provide some useful lessons as the president contemplates whether to send more troops to Afghanistan. U.S. military involvement in other peoples' civil wars has not been notably successful. Perhaps Vietnam, Lebanon and Somalia should have taught that determined fighters on their own land can chase us out or outlast us. Add to that the Afghans remarkable success in expelling intruders. The Russians could not pacify the country in the 1980s despite having all the advantages that the U.S. does not; a much larger army, a contiguous land border with much shorter supply lines, and far less need to be concerned with domestic public opinion.

President Obama would be well served by considering the possibility that the U.S. is looked upon as just another military intruder who comes in and kills for a while and then leaves villagers to their fate. The generals now acknowledge that won't work, and the rapidly mounting casualty figures suggest that we are an easy target on the battlefield. At home, Americans are showing signs of tiring of the fight, notwithstanding calls from the political right to fulfill General McCrystal's request and carry on to certain victory.

All this is like a cancer sapping strength until the American body politic is finally overcome by the pointlessness of the effort. In addition, we still must contemplate that we have no genuine partner in Afghanistan, and will be supporting a proven loser if Hamid Karzai is re-elected in what seems certain to be a flawed runoff election.

There appears to be only one route to a measure of success in stabilizing this non-functioning country. Essentially we need to focus on policies that will amount to a buyout of those elements in Afghanistan who might be convinced to treat the U.S. other than as an occupying force or target of attack. This means identifying and negotiating with warlords and even enemy groups who have interests to defend and might be persuaded that it is in their best interests to fend off a Taliban takeover.

The billions of dollars spent in Afghanistan can be put to better use than providing more targets for insurgents to shoot at. An additional 40,000 American troops should not be necessary to identify and fund Afghans to do their own fighting. If we do not put limits on our involvement in nation building tasks that appear to be hopeless, the morass we are in is only likely to lead to an increasing commitment to futility in a land where our troops cannot be sustained.

This is not to recommend any immediate drawdown, but a more realistic policy of doing only what we can with the resources we have already committed. Even if that means that more territory will fall under the control of the Taliban, it does not necessarily mean that their capability for terrorism will increase. More likely the Taliban will become the targets if Afghan towns can muster the determination to protect their own interests.

We routed the Taliban in about 100 days when we went in after 9/11. Nearly eight years later we should be learning that remaking Afghanistan in our own democratic image is not a realistic aspiration. Nor is it necessary to protect our vital interests. We can only help the Afghans protect themselves if they are willing to do so.

Pakistan has come to realize that preventing a Taliban takeover of the Swat Valley and South Waziristan is a vital national interest, and the military has been sent into both areas this year. Afghanistan does not have an effective military. That means we should be focusing on helping local militias who might offer the prospects of regional regimes less offensive than the Taliban.

We will not be able to build a real country in Afghanistan at any reasonable cost. Nor can we expect to find genuine partners in this lawless country. Stabilization will not come unless the Afghans do it themselves, and that might well mean numerous brutal regimes in a rather large land that is a country far more in name than in deed.

There is no good choice for President Obama. If history is any guide, expanding the war appears to offer even less likelihood of an unpalatable peace than dealing with the Taliban. President Obama should hope the Pakistani push to quell the Taliban there has an effect in Afghanistan, and tell his generals to select limited strategic goals that might be reached with the troops and resources on the ground now.

Goldsmith is a former director of the American Institute in Taiwan's Kaohsiung Office, and author of “Jade Phoenix,” a prize-winning novel of 1970s Taiwan that is offered in a Far East edition by Bookman Books Ltd. in Taipei. Goldsmith can be reached at syd.goldsmith@gmail.com.