![]() |
www.ChinaPost.com.tw |
|
|
|
|
Pakistan may find itself lost in a minefield, about to step on a mine Things in Pakistan are about to get a lot worse. The recent government intervention into Buner Agency, an area no less than 100 km outside of the country's capital Islamabad and adjacent to the Taliban controlled Swat Valley, signifies a worsening shift in an already escalating conflict. Some observers will be relieved to see that the Pakistani military is finally willing to deal with the threats posed by militants. Despite this, very little can be said in support of the military, as it has a recent history of bungled operations and cowardice when confronting militants who now openly proclaim their aims towards toppling the government and instituting Shariah law. Its purported 'success' in liberating Bajaur, another territory formerly held by Taliban elements, resulted in the near-total destruction of that agency's population centers. In the process, over 300,000 people were displaced, making up more than fifty-percent of that region's population. The army's decision to rely on helicopter gunships, artillery, and air-strikes to kill individual fighters armed with AK-47s and RPGs will only hurt it in the long run. If anything, the hard handed tactics will only result in increased popular resentment and greater Talibanization. Since its inception in 1947, Pakistan has for the most part been in a state of continuous upheaval; the majority of which can be considered a result of petty, brutal and corrupt administrations. Starting three wars with its neighbor India, the leadership whether civilian or military has continually used hostility on its southern border as an excuse to maintain an absurd level of militarization in face of a collapsing economy, huge discrepancies in wealth and religious extremism. Corruption in leadership at the top has impeded genuine leadership on the ground. Today, the state controls an ever decreasing amount of land and appears unwilling or even paralyzed to start any widespread campaign against religious militarism. So much so that according to a recent BBC news documentary, segments of the wealthy elite are either in the midst of quietly fleeing the country or are preparing to do so en masse, all the while, this has left underfunded local authorities in the impossible position of having to deal with a well-funded web of religious militants. The attacks on Sri Lanka's cricket team and the brazen assault on the Manawan Police Training School in Lahore over the course of March epitomize the Taliban's keen ability to infiltrate Pakistani cities and overwhelm basic functions of the state. Open attacks let alone suicide bombings have put the country in such a position where it faces the very real possibility of collapse. Unfortunately, the only mechanism with which Western and Pakistani policymakers can hope to hold it together is the same institution that has leached off the country since its foundation, the military. Pakistan is not a nation, but in fact an amalgamation of Punjabis (45%), Pashtuns (15%), Sindhis (14%) and various other small ethnic groups. Despite having a common religion, all of these groups have their own separate and at times conflicting interests. Because of this, it is virtually impossible to find a national secular institution outside of the military that has the influence and power to rally support.Letter to the Editor Compounding efforts to deal with the tactical and strategic dimensions of fighting a growing insurgency lie stark fissures in the country's social landscape that will have to be bridged. One reason that the Taliban have been so successful in holding on to recently acquired territories is their ability to overturn Pakistan's archaic land distribution system. To many in the developed word, feudalism seems something of a far bygone era. Nonetheless, this 18th century phenomenon remains well and alive in Pakistan at the start of the 21st century. Dividing the society between tenant farmers and permanent landholding families, this ugly perpetually unfair system creates an exploitable class inequality that the insurgents have used to good measure in winning over previously landless peasants. Land reform can thus serve to inoculate against the further spread of extremism. On this point, American decision makers can make a significant positive impact by replicating land re-distribution policies used in post-WWII Japan, and South Korea. At the same time, elements of the insurgency have infiltrated major population hubs and established themselves in the poor slums that dominate so much of the country's urban life. Raising funds while setting up madrasahs, the Taliban are gaining influence in previously progressive centers including Lahore. Taking over mining operations, controlling highways and extorting money from previously sound companies, the insurgents are in a position of ever greater financial stability. Recently, they have used this to their advantage by branching out to other militant groups in Kashmir and Punjab. In sharp contrast, the government of Asif Ali Zardari has been essentially put to the task of begging for money from China, Japan, the U.S. and the IMF. Faced with a global economic downturn that will decimate much of his country's economy and having to support a military that eats up too much of his budget on nuclear weapons, recently purchased destroyers and modern tanks; Zardari is in the unenviable position of being a weak civilian leader who not only faces a growing insurgency but also a stubborn and incompetent military. Any US aid should therefore be directed towards supporting the country's policemen and not the likes of F-16s and sophisticated drone aircraft. If the Taliban's gains are to be reversed, it will be done with boots on the ground and not jet fighters designed to be a nuclear weapons platform. To date, most of the country's 670,000 man army is not fighting the Taliban but instead sitting on the Indian border waiting for a war that won't happen. General Petraeus, the head of the U.S. Central Command recently called for Pakistan to 'redirect its military focus.' As of yet, it is not clear just how far American engagement can lead towards turning Pakistan away from its age-old paranoia where India is concerned. One thing is certain however, if this war is to be won in the next four to five years, it will most certainly require active support from most of the country's military. If this doesn't happen, Pakistan will find itself lost in a minefield and about to step on a land mine. Ross is a graduate from the University of British Columbia and a Huayu Enrichment Scholar studying Chinese in Taiwan. |
| Copyright © 1999 – 2009 The China Post. |
| Back to Story |