There is no doubt that piracy should be dealt with, but the world's naval response is a short-sighted one that may be ineffective because it doesn't address the real causes behind Somalia's piracy, which lie in the country's economic and political problems.

For Somalia, one of the world's most dangerous and poorest countries, its troubles have continued since a 1991 civil war that practically shattered the nation into fiefdoms and breakaway territories. A string of feeble governments existed with little authority while the country was racked by fighting, natural disasters and disorder. All aspects of a modern state, including national institutions, the rule of law and social services have since disintegrated. The U.N., African Union and NGOs are or have been involved in relief and peacekeeping missions, both proving inadequate and ineffectual.

In 2006, an Islamist movement captured the capital Mogadishu and was able to rule over a significant area, but was quickly driven out by Ethiopian troops supported by the U.S.

At present, the country is ruled by several warlord factions, Islamic groups and a weak Transitional Federal Government.

Over 400,000 are estimated to have died in Somalia's 18 years of civil strife, and over a million have been made homeless. At least 73% of the population earn less than US$2 a day and millions depend on food aid, according to the U.N. While an informal economy does exist, the lack of law and authority as well as poverty means there are little real jobs and business and education opportunities.

Most pirates operate from Puntland, an area in northern Somalia that has functioned as an autonomous region since 1998 though not actually seceding from Somalia. Like the rest of Somalia, Puntland is impoverished, though it is more stable.

With a long coastline abundant with fish and marine life, fishing was one of Puntland's main industries. With Somalia's breakdown and the lack of a coast guard or navy to protect their waters, foreign fishing vessels were quick to take advantage by encroaching into the waters off Puntland and fishing with impunity. More insidious, nuclear waste from European nations turned up in these same waters when the 2005 tsunami pushed hundreds of illegally dumped barrels to shore.

The international community, including the U.S., sat on the sidelines and did nothing about these issues. Somali fishermen formed vigilante bands to drive off or capture the foreign boats, and from these humble beginnings, spawned today's large-scale piracy. No doubt, these pirates have become more sophisticated and organized and their objectives have gone beyond protecting local fishing areas.

The world's response has been to send military vessels to patrol the waters and protect vessels passing through. Clashes, arrests and rescue operations have occurred, but with the pirate threat still increasing, there has been talk of escalating military operations as well as arming merchant ships.

Unfortunately, there has been little mention of a humanitarian mission or efforts to help restore order and governance in Somalia. A U.N. conference will gather donors for a mission to help rebuild Somalia, but there is little optimism given the focus on piracy and the difficulties in getting involved in Somalia.

This is a fallacy because the absence of a functioning society and viable occupations will continue to drive Somalis to the pirate fleets, regardless of the international military response.

“Without piracy, a typical Somalian would earn less than US$30 a month; with piracy, a young Somalian could earn US$1,000 or be killed. The risk is worth it,” says John Burnett, author of a book on modern piracy, “Dangerous Waters.” Burnett also served in Somalia with an NGO in the late nineties and observed the beginnings of the pirate movement. “The naval efforts are a band-aid to a festering wound. They have not been effective,” said Burnett.

The giant multi-million dollar bounties that the pirates command from the ships they do seize encourage and allow them to be even more organized and better-equipped to continue their attacks. A U.N. envoy, Ahmedou Ould Abdallah said that Somali pirates made over US$120 million in 2008 from their attacks and ransoms.

Despite the growing international armada and media attention, pirate attacks have continued to escalate this year, with 61 attacks having taken place so far in the Gulf of Aden and east Somalia, compared to six last year in the same period, according to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB).

Some commentators, experts and Somali expatriates have spoken out about the connection between Somalia's unrest and piracy, and the need for international support, not just military action. Even U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates acknowledged this at a talk earlier this month, as mentioned in a Time magazine article.

“As long as you've got this incredible number of poor people and the risks are relatively small,” he was quoted as saying, “there's really no way in my view to control [piracy] unless you get something on land that begins to change the equation for these kids.”

The U.S. is understandably spooked from its Somalia experience in the early '90s, especially the infamous “Black Hawk” incident, and bringing order there would not be easy. But ignoring the problem for almost 20 years has only caused Somalia's chaos to spread beyond its borders in the form of piracy with international ramifications, from which even Taiwan is not immune. Piracy is not even the only fear about Somalia for the U.S., which is concerned with Islamic fundamentalist groups and their links to al-Qaida.

Somalia shares several unfortunate parallels with Afghanistan, arguably the biggest problem for the U.S. now. Like Somalia, Afghanistan underwent many years of unrest after the exit of the Soviet Union in 1989, during which it received little international aid or attention.

The lack of central governance led to a political and social vacuum with competing factions, which paved the way for the Taliban to gain power. They defeated most of the warlords and by 2001, were the de facto rulers of the nation. Despite little international diplomatic recognition, the Taliban became a world problem when they harbored Osama bin-Laden and his al-Qaida organization.

A large portion of the blame for this lies on the U.S. whose lack of support during the nineties were in stark contrast to its secretive but enthusiastic backing of the Afghan (mujahideen) resistance to the Soviets. Once the Soviets were forced out, the country's factions, laden with weapons, fought amongst themselves due to ethnic grievances and territorial ambitions.

By focusing on naval efforts as the solution to piracy, the world community is choosing to only deal with the symptoms, not the causes, of a significant problem. A more prudent course of action would be to restore order in Somalia and thus strip away the allure of piracy.