President Dmitry Medvedev of Russia has brought this complex -- and ominous -- subject back to the headlines by flamboyantly announcing deployment of Iskander missiles to Kaliningrad, a forward area close to Western Europe. The Bush administration some time ago announced planned deployment of U.S. anti-ballistic missiles in Poland, with associated radar installations in the Czech Republic. The focus of this development is Europe but the implications are global, including direct bearing on Asia, given North Korea's fitful and at times frightening nuclear moves.

Medvedev's announcement was timed to coincide with Sen. Barack Obama's election as the next president of the United States. Perhaps Medvedev, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and the others who rule Russia were interested only in upstaging the American elections and the president-elect. Perhaps this move is part of a much larger strategic plan, including the recent invasion of Georgia, to assert Russian military power.

In any case, Obama has not risen to the bait. The president-elect has stressed that our country has only one president at a time, and refuses to get drawn into policy debates about moves by either Moscow or Washington. His staff has described the topic of missiles in Europe as open for future consideration. Pentagon pressure for anti-ballistic missiles dates back to the 1950s and the Eisenhower administration. At that time, defense spending absorbed more than half the entire federal budget, and a much larger percentage of gross national product than today. Ike maintained control over the military primarily, though not exclusively, by putting an overall ceiling on the Pentagon budget, effectively setting the Air Force, Army and Navy against one another for available resources.One byproduct was considerable duplication of effort. Each service, for example, developed a separate strategic missile program, jealously guarding research and development information from the others. Robert McNamara, defense secretary in the successor Kennedy administration, was instantly offended by the lack of logic in the Eisenhower approach and decisively imposed organization-chart order. The Air Force was given land-based strategic missiles, the Navy sea-based submarine systems, and the Army was removed from the game.

The secretary and his generally young civilian analysts also rejected arguments for anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs) because any conceivable defensive systems could be overwhelmed at relatively low cost by simply increasing the number of attack vehicles.

McNamara's policies and style quickly unified the services against him. The Army pressed successfully for an ABM role. When President Lyndon Johnson forced the secretary to resign, he gave him the choice post of president of the World Bank, but also made him publicly announce support for the ABM system.

President Ronald Reagan gave priority to exotic space-based missile interceptors, termed the Strategic Defense Initiative or 'Star Wars'. The Air Force became the leading service but the entire Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed the effort, with Reagan and Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger prime exponents.

The Bush administration has gone to great lengths to deny the current missile defense program is directed at Russia. There has been an offer to include Moscow in planning and emphasis on the limited number of interceptors.

The Czech-Poland deployment can be defended as prudent given possible threats from Iran, North Korea or other extremist states. Nuclear strategist Herman Kahn used precisely that argument in trying to bolster the humiliated McNamara when the earlier ABM system was announced. However, the current missile deployment greatly spurs endemic Russian insecurities. The new Obama administration should give high priority to evaluation of this policy. Meanwhile, Ike continues to look better all the time.

Arthur I. Cyr is Clausen Distinguished Professor at Carthage College in Wisconsin and author of "After the Cold War" (NYU Press and Palgrave/Macmillan). He can be reached at acyr@carthage.edu