With the change in government in Islamabad, it is not even clear who -- or even which government organization -- is currently calling the shots regarding security operations along the Afghanistan border.

Many experts assert the Pakistani military under Gen. Asfaq Parvez Kayani -- not the elected political leadership -- is now directing and controlling the fight against the Taliban and al-Qaida in the FATA. (Supporting this notion are the high-frequency visits to Pakistan of senior U.S. military officials such as Adm. Mullen.) Adding to the challenges, American cross-border Special Forces raids and Predator drone strikes into Pakistan have raised political hackles in Islamabad, potentially jeopardizing counterterrorism cooperation in the border area or leading to an unintended engagement between U.S. and Pakistani forces.

Making matters worse, Pakistan's controversial Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), a military entity that helped establish the Taliban in the 1990s, is reportedly still supporting them to retain influence in Afghanistan, which has caused lots of bad blood with both Kabul and Washington.

Taliban problem

Unfortunately, the Taliban have found a welcome sanctuary -- and kinship -- on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistan border among the ethnic Pashtun tribes, which dominate that region.

The Taliban are no match for American or NATO forces on the battlefield, suffering huge losses when confronting coalition forces head-on. But the Taliban appear to have taken some pages from the Iraq-insurgency playbook.

They have turned to asymmetric tactics, such as improvised explosive devices (IEDs), car and suicide bombings, and attacks on civilians, to advance their goal of regaining control of Afghanistan. Indeed, the Taliban are reportedly setting up a parallel government in some areas of the country.

Like in Baghdad, the insurgency has also increasingly turned its sights on the Afghan capital, where attacks are sharply up, hoping to generate propaganda-worthy news and undermine confidence in the government at home and abroad.

Taliban forces are not large in conventional army terms, ranging from 5,000 to 20,000 dedicated combatants, but their size is significant relative to the number of coalition forces -- not to mention the force-multiplier effect of their guerilla and terror tactics.

State-sponsorship also helps the Taliban thrive. Beyond Pakistan, based on recovered Iranian-made weapons in Afghanistan, Iran is believed to be providing arms to the Taliban, too, just like it has supplied Shia insurgents in Iraq.

Unfortunately, the Taliban also find fellow travelers in other militant groups such as Afghan warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Pakistani terror groups -- not to mention al-Qaida.Al-Qaida ascent

While al-Qaida lost its training camps in Afghanistan with the 2001 U.S. invasion, its leadership and operatives have taken a renewed interest in their old haunt, especially since they began taking a pounding in Iraq.

Though far fewer in number than the Taliban in Afghanistan, al-Qaida sees the unsettled country as a potential soft spot, as it probes the Muslim world for new safe havens that will provide training and operating bases.

Indeed, al-Qaida looks for targets of opportunity that will allow it to score real military -- or perceived propaganda -- victories against the United States and the West, leading to a boost in morale, notoriety, fund raising and recruiting.

Like the Taliban, al-Qaida is also coordinating its efforts with antigovernment groups in Afghanistan.

And while there is limited awareness of al-Qaida's Iraq veterans making their way to Afghanistan, some are believed to have done so, bringing tactics and techniques with them.

Regrettably, al-Qaida, the Taliban, warlords, insurgents and criminals are finding funding for opposing Kabul and coalition forces in Afghanistan's biggest export: opium.

Narcotics network

According to the CIA, Afghanistan is the world's largest producer of opium. In fact, poppy cultivation and opium production are at near-record levels, impeded only by a recent drought. Like elsewhere, poverty, high-profits and widespread corruption impede effective governance and counterdrug efforts, allowing the bulk of Afghanistan's opium to find its way to Russia and Europe as deadly heroin.

The Taliban, al-Qaida and other militants profit from the drug trade by taxing local farmers and extorting narco-traffickers for providing protection services for cultivation, production and shipment.

No small business, American and United Nations analysts estimate the US$4 billion Afghan drug trade provides 40 percent to 60 percent of the Taliban's operational funding.

This near-endless source of revenue allows the insurgents to plan, train and operate, including buying weapons, providing subsistence, gathering intelligence, bribing officials, renting safe houses and running camps.

Long-term efforts

So where does this difficult assessment leave us? While more U.S. and, perhaps, NATO troops will likely flow into Afghanistan in the months to come, Adm. Mullen warns that more boots on the ground are not the ultimate answer: "We can't kill our way to victory [in Afghanistan]. ... [I]t is my professional opinion that no amount of troops in no amount of time can ever achieve all the objectives we seek in Afghanistan."

Indeed, the JCS chairman is very likely correct.

Foreign troops can provide the security, that is, the breathing room, needed to address the political, economic and social challenges that often accompany conflict. But troops alone will not solve these issues.

While the surge in Iraq was a key element in achieving today's relative stability, there were other factors, such as political progress, economic development and buy-in among the people for a better life that also made a big difference.

As Assistant Secretary Boucher noted recently: "With sustained resources and effort, we have every prospect of securing a stable, democratic and lasting ally in Afghanistan and an important linchpin for the region." But it will take time.

Afghanistan is clearly a long-term project for the international community. Considering the stakes for the United States in terms of geopolitics, radicalism, terrorism and narcotics, failure is not a good option -- to say the least.

But just like in Iraq, where America has shed much blood and spent much treasure, it is the Afghans who will have to ultimately step up to wrest back their country from those such as the Taliban and al-Qaida who seek to subjugate them.

Peter Brookes is a Heritage Foundation senior fellow and a former deputy assistant secretary of defense.