Today, Afghanistan is entrenched in a slugfest with terrorists, insurgents and drug traffickers. The country is struggling to embrace democracy, develop economically and build a sustainable civil society following three decades of turmoil.

But while Afghanistan is not in as bad a shape as Iraq was in the summer of 2006 when Iraq was in a dangerous, seemingly irreversible downward spiral, Afghanistan has not yet completely escaped that fate.

Indeed, in September congressional testimony, top Pentagon brass gave a very sobering assessment. For instance, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said he is “not convinced we’re winning” and “time is running out” to stabilize Afghanistan.

Focused attention and a concerted effort by the United States and its coalition partners, especially NATO, will be required to keep Afghanistan from looking — indeed, falling — into an Iraq-like abyss.

Despite the current challenges in Afghanistan, there has been real progress since U.S. and coalition forces invaded in the weeks after the attacks of September 11, according to the Bush administration.

Beginning in late 2001, the United States and its partners helped topple the Taliban, ending their repressive rule over large parts of Afghanistan and its support for Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaida acolytes.

Since then, with international assistance, President Hamid Karzai’s government has set about building infrastructure, providing education, doling out health care and establishing security services such as the Afghan police and army.

For instance, before 2002, Afghanistan had only tens of miles of paved roads and fewer than 1 million children attended school. Today, there are more than 1,000 miles of road and 6 million kids attend school — one-third of them are girls.

In support of this effort, 60,000 coalition troops, including 30,000 Americans with overwhelming fire power, provide security, working alongside Afghanistan’s 60,000-man national army and 80,000 police. In fact, according to Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Richard Boucher, “Broad swaths of Afghanistan are hardly recognizable in contrast to where they were in 2001.”

While this is undoubtedly true, especially considering Afghanistan’s constant state of turbulence since the Communist coup and Soviet invasion in the late 1970s, much work remains to be done.

The Muslim country of more than 30 million has no shortage of needs: Illiteracy exceeds 70 percent; more than half live in poverty; unemployment hovers near 40 percent; and life expectancy averages the mid-40s, according to the CIA.

A September State Department Travel Warning cautioned that no part of Afghanistan should be “considered immune from violence ... Afghan authorities have a limited ability to maintain order and ensure the security of citizens and visitors.”

The report also noted the “number of attacks in the south and southwestern areas of the country continue to be high as a result of insurgent and drug-related activity.” More than 100 attacks took place in Kabul, and an additional 4,400 attacks occurred nationwide since last September.

Insurgent and terrorist attacks are at an all-time high, and rising — they are up 30 percent from 2007. Deaths of U.S. and NATO soldiers are also at record levels, already exceeding last year’s total.

By some estimates, the central government may control as little as 30 percent to 50 percent of the vast country.

Moreover, issues of governance (especially competence at the local level and widespread corruption), the rule of law, respect for human rights, hunger and the availability of basic human services are still problems.

Making matters worse, the drug trade may account for up to half of Afghanistan’s gross domestic product of US$8 billion — and international political, military and economic aid and investment have been insufficient to deal with the wide-ranging challenges.

A lawless, failed state that could host a range of bad actors is a distinct possibility.

For their part, Afghans are frustrated, too. An outcry has erupted over accidental civilian casualties attributed to coalition military operations — which the insurgency has been quick to seize upon for propaganda purposes.

The JCS chairman, Adm. Mike Mullen, recently told Congress that “a new, more comprehensive strategy” is needed in Afghanistan that “covers both sides of the border.” The other side of the border in this case: Pakistan.

Indeed, while Afghanistan, an ethnically diverse country the size of Texas, still faces an array of difficult obstacles, perhaps the biggest hurdle to peace and stability comes not from within, but from without.

Pakistan problem

What happens in neighboring Pakistan, especially in the tribal areas along the border, may have as much of an effect on Afghanistan’s future as anything that happens in Afghanistan itself.

Pakistan, a teeming country of 160 million people, is, by some measures, in peril itself. The Muslim state is beleaguered by religious fervor, militancy, poverty and economic woes.

Unbeknownst to many, it is one of the world’s most terror-afflicted countries, as evidenced by the horrific attack on the Marriott hotel in Islamabad in September.

Indeed, the Taliban and al-Qaida have taken refuge in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) along the 1,500-mile Afghanistan-Pakistan border, from where they plot, train and launch operations.

CIA Director Michael Hayden said this year that the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area is a “clear and present danger to Afghanistan, to Pakistan and to the West in general, and to the United States in particular.”

Indeed, a number of plots, including attacks in the United Kingdom and the foiled summer 2006 liquid-explosives conspiracy against airliners flying from Britain to the United States and Canada, were hatched by al-Qaida in Pakistan.

Moreover, U.S. intelligence has been confident for some time that Osama bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al Zawahiri, are located in Pakistan’s unruly border regions, under the protection of tribal leaders.

Peter Brookes is a Heritage Foundation senior fellow and a former deputy assistant secretary of defense.