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Updated Wednesday, March 10, 2010 10:23 am TWN, By John Lee, Special to The China Post High level meeting offers Australian PM redemptionThe blow to the Australian PM's foreign policy credentials is somewhat surprising. Having positioning himself as Australia's intellectual, Mandarin-speaking statesman-in-waiting while in Opposition, experts expected that Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd would usher in an enhanced era of Asian engagement. The Australian prime minister had promised to ramp up Australia's “middle power” activism and creativity in Asia. Asian leaders and elites appreciated an Australian leader with an avowed interest and expertise in Asia. Yet, under Rudd's leadership, Canberra has managed to enrage Beijing, irritate New Delhi, antagonize Singapore and annoy Tokyo and Jakarta. When it comes to Southeast Asia, the government stumbled when Rudd first proposed a security structure in 2008 for an Asia Pacific Community (APC) that could take its inspiration from the European Union and discuss the full range of strategic, security, and economic issues in the region within the one new multilateral forum. He has been trying to recover ever since. There were two problems with this proposal. The first is that it misread the strategic zeitgeist. Like all states in the region, the main question revolves around what to do about China's rise. Most states — large and small - want to avoid the formal discussion of top-level security matters (e.g., great power tensions or an increased role for the Chinese navy) in any all-inclusive multilateral security forum for fear of having to explicitly 'rebuff' Beijing. Furthermore, the unspoken preference of most Asian states is to resist offering China a forum for a more equal say in security matters, especially regarding matters in the South China Sea, until China is truly enmeshed and committed to regional rules and norms. This is not yet sufficiently the case and the APC would have diluted existing leverage over China without Beijing offering any meaningful commitments in return. The second problem is one of both leadership style and substance. Known for making foreign policy and other big decisions “on the run,” the Australian PM never bothered to consult with regional leaders before launching an idea that could radically change the way strategic and diplomatic interaction is to take place. In insulting an already skeptical region, his special APC envoy, Richard Woolcott, was reportedly offered the post only two hours before it was first announced. Worse still, when it came to substance, the APC would presumably eventually replace the so-called “weak” institution of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) even though Australia is not a member of ASEAN. Canberra, smugly enjoying the American security guarantee, was telling Southeast Asia how to reorganize its strategic future without the Australian leader having even discussed his ideas with key regional leaders. |
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