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Updated Saturday, October 25, 2008 10:59 am TWN, By Peter Brookers, Special to The China Post Afghanistan: On the edge with no solution -- PART IIWhile al-Qaida lost its training camps in Afghanistan with the 2001 U.S. invasion, its leadership and operatives have taken a renewed interest in their old haunt, especially since they began taking a pounding in Iraq. Though far fewer in number than the Taliban in Afghanistan, al-Qaida sees the unsettled country as a potential soft spot, as it probes the Muslim world for new safe havens that will provide training and operating bases. Indeed, al-Qaida looks for targets of opportunity that will allow it to score real military — or perceived propaganda — victories against the United States and the West, leading to a boost in morale, notoriety, fund raising and recruiting. Like the Taliban, al-Qaida is also coordinating its efforts with antigovernment groups in Afghanistan. And while there is limited awareness of al-Qaida’s Iraq veterans making their way to Afghanistan, some are believed to have done so, bringing tactics and techniques with them. Regrettably, al-Qaida, the Taliban, warlords, insurgents and criminals are finding funding for opposing Kabul and coalition forces in Afghanistan’s biggest export: opium. Narcotics network According to the CIA, Afghanistan is the world’s largest producer of opium. In fact, poppy cultivation and opium production are at near-record levels, impeded only by a recent drought. Like elsewhere, poverty, high-profits and widespread corruption impede effective governance and counterdrug efforts, allowing the bulk of Afghanistan’s opium to find its way to Russia and Europe as deadly heroin. The Taliban, al-Qaida and other militants profit from the drug trade by taxing local farmers and extorting narco-traffickers for providing protection services for cultivation, production and shipment. No small business, American and United Nations analysts estimate the US$4 billion Afghan drug trade provides 40 percent to 60 percent of the Taliban’s operational funding. This near-endless source of revenue allows the insurgents to plan, train and operate, including buying weapons, providing subsistence, gathering intelligence, bribing officials, renting safe houses and running camps. Long-term efforts So where does this difficult assessment leave us? While more U.S. and, perhaps, NATO troops will likely flow into Afghanistan in the months to come, Adm. Mullen warns that more boots on the ground are not the ultimate answer: “We can’t kill our way to victory [in Afghanistan]. ... [I]t is my professional opinion that no amount of troops in no amount of time can ever achieve all the objectives we seek in Afghanistan.” Indeed, the JCS chairman is very likely correct. Foreign troops can provide the security, that is, the breathing room, needed to address the political, economic and social challenges that often accompany conflict. But troops alone will not solve these issues. While the surge in Iraq was a key element in achieving today’s relative stability, there were other factors, such as political progress, economic development and buy-in among the people for a better life that also made a big difference. As Assistant Secretary Boucher noted recently: “With sustained resources and effort, we have every prospect of securing a stable, democratic and lasting ally in Afghanistan and an important linchpin for the region.” But it will take time. Afghanistan is clearly a long-term project for the international community. Considering the stakes for the United States in terms of geopolitics, radicalism, terrorism and narcotics, failure is not a good option — to say the least. But just like in Iraq, where America has shed much blood and spent much treasure, it is the Afghans who will have to ultimately step up to wrest back their country from those such as the Taliban and al-Qaida who seek to subjugate them. Peter Brookes is a Heritage Foundation senior fellow and a former deputy assistant secretary of defense. |
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