Lessons of lost U.S.-Taiwan trust

Trust between Taipei and Washington is of vital importance, first because Taiwan’s security and responsible diplomacy hinge on avoiding the perception of abandonment by the Unites States. Second, mutual trust is essential to the U.S. stabilizing role in cross-strait relations because Washington needs assurance that Taipei will not entrap it in an unnecessary conflict with China. Third, any lack of trust between Taiwan and the U.S. injects unwelcome uncertainty into both sides’ relations with Beijing.

In the early days of President George W. Bush’s administration, U.S. support for Taiwan was approaching a level not seen in decades. Today, mutual confidence in the relationship is reminiscent of 1970s lows. So before laying out an agenda for improving U.S.-Taiwan trust, it is useful to examine the reasons why trust was damaged during Chen Shui-bian’s tenure.

First, there were perceptions of betrayal on both sides. President Chen articulated in his 2000 inaugural address “four noes” regarding Taiwan’s international status. U.S. officials considered Chen’s subsequent statements on Taiwan independence and the constitution, initiatives to use “Taiwan” instead of “Republic of China,” discontinuation of the National Unification Council, and pursuit of referendum politics as going back on his word. International friends of Taiwan faced Chen’s public use of their support and cooperation to score partisan points. Chen’s identity politics to garner votes domestically came at the expense of trust internationally.

Meanwhile, some in Taiwan felt that Washington abandoned Taiwan’s democracy for profitable relations with China and post-Sept. 11 security priorities. They allege that Washington takes cues from Beijing on how to deal with Taiwan. Some groups in Taiwan express the sentiment that the island is so strategically important, America must protect it, and that Taiwan “standing up to China” is what Washington really wants. They feel betrayed when U.S. officials make clear the position of “no unilateral change to the status quo” and criticize Taiwan policies.

Second, there was lack of consultation and mutual respect. U.S.-Taiwan trust needs open and stable communication between executive and legislative branches. Unfortunately, Washington places prohibitive restrictions on official contacts. What is more, the Chen administration fell short in staffing Taiwan’s foreign policy. Many policy experts remained loyal to the KMT camp while Chen’s DPP lacked human resources and did not sufficiently reach across the aisle. Chen often shuffled appointed positions for political reasons; with such turnover, it proved difficult to develop coherent policy and build trust with officials of other governments.

Chen’s administration also presented surprises — such as “one country each side” or discontinuing the Unification Council — without meaningful consultation with Washington. Unpredictability damages trust, as does diplomatic scolding. The Bush administration felt compelled to admonish Taiwan publicly, especially regarding the U.N. referendum. While the referendum is unlikely to pass, it caused unfortunate perceptions of Washington not adequately respecting Taiwan’s democracy and Taiwan not adequately respecting U.S. interests.

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