Pakistan's nuclear weapons are safe for now, but still cause for concern

Nor are they moved except in times of crisis — as happened in 1999 and 2001/2002 during confrontations with India.

Other security measures cited by analysts, but hard to confirm, include the separation of warheads from detonators.

They also say the army is believed to have developed a rudimentary system to electronically lock its nuclear weapons, modeled on the U.S. Permissive Action Link (PAL).

Nonetheless, the ability of Islamist militants, some linked to al-Qaida, to strike apparently at will in Pakistan's heartland Punjab province, give pause for thought.

Both Rawalpindi and Islamabad, respectively the military and political capitals, have come under attack in recent weeks.

Evolving Tactics

Last month's attack at army headquarters in Rawalpindi demonstrated a sophistication in tactics which could be developed further for an assault on a nuclear installation.

The gunmen, wearing army uniform, were able to break through a security gate, and take hostages.

The raid, and the drive-by fatal shooting in Islamabad of a brigadier on leave from peacekeeping duties in Sudan, also suggested militants had good intelligence on the military. Two other brigadiers were shot at in Islamabad, but survived.

According to Gregory, over the last few years militants had launched attacks outside bases believed to be involved in part of Pakistan's nuclear infrastructure — including the manufacture and assembly of components.

They had also evolved forms of attack which could combine suicide bombers with ground assault teams. “This tactic could be used to penetrate even highly defended sites,” he said.

And while Pakistan's nuclear arsenals are thought to be stored deep within the country, possibly in Sind and Baluchistan provinces, nuclear weapons production sites in Punjab, scene of much of the latest violence, could prove more vulnerable.

This would not mean the attackers would obtain a functioning nuclear bomb. And even if they were able to penetrate a nuclear production site, they would still have to manage the logistics under fire of removing the 25 kg (55 lb) of fissile material needed to make a nuclear bomb.

But they could seize material for a dirty bomb — which causes relatively few casualties but major environmental damage — and valuable technology while scoring a propaganda coup.

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