Pakistan may find itself lost in a minefield, about to step on a mine

Compounding efforts to deal with the tactical and strategic dimensions of fighting a growing insurgency lie stark fissures in the country's social landscape that will have to be bridged. One reason that the Taliban have been so successful in holding on to recently acquired territories is their ability to overturn Pakistan's archaic land distribution system.

To many in the developed word, feudalism seems something of a far bygone era. Nonetheless, this 18th century phenomenon remains well and alive in Pakistan at the start of the 21st century.

Dividing the society between tenant farmers and permanent landholding families, this ugly perpetually unfair system creates an exploitable class inequality that the insurgents have used to good measure in winning over previously landless peasants. Land reform can thus serve to inoculate against the further spread of extremism. On this point, American decision makers can make a significant positive impact by replicating land re-distribution policies used in post-WWII Japan, and South Korea.

At the same time, elements of the insurgency have infiltrated major population hubs and established themselves in the poor slums that dominate so much of the country's urban life. Raising funds while setting up madrasahs, the Taliban are gaining influence in previously progressive centers including Lahore.

Taking over mining operations, controlling highways and extorting money from previously sound companies, the insurgents are in a position of ever greater financial stability. Recently, they have used this to their advantage by branching out to other militant groups in Kashmir and Punjab.

In sharp contrast, the government of Asif Ali Zardari has been essentially put to the task of begging for money from China, Japan, the U.S. and the IMF. Faced with a global economic downturn that will decimate much of his country's economy and having to support a military that eats up too much of his budget on nuclear weapons, recently purchased destroyers and modern tanks; Zardari is in the unenviable position of being a weak civilian leader who not only faces a growing insurgency but also a stubborn and incompetent military. Any US aid should therefore be directed towards supporting the country's policemen and not the likes of F-16s and sophisticated drone aircraft.

If the Taliban's gains are to be reversed, it will be done with boots on the ground and not jet fighters designed to be a nuclear weapons platform.

To date, most of the country's 670,000 man army is not fighting the Taliban but instead sitting on the Indian border waiting for a war that won't happen. General Petraeus, the head of the U.S. Central Command recently called for Pakistan to 'redirect its military focus.' As of yet, it is not clear just how far American engagement can lead towards turning Pakistan away from its age-old paranoia where India is concerned. One thing is certain however, if this war is to be won in the next four to five years, it will most certainly require active support from most of the country's military. If this doesn't happen, Pakistan will find itself lost in a minefield and about to step on a land mine.

Ross is a graduate from the University of British Columbia and a Huayu Enrichment Scholar studying Chinese in Taiwan.

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