Countering information warfare

Indeed, in the last few weeks, all four capitals have pointed an accusatory finger at Beijing for attempting to infiltrate — or having succeeded in penetrating — their diplomatic or defense establishment computer networks.

While snooping by the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) cyber-soldiers on unclassified government Web sites and e-mail might be expected, the recent rash of incidents shines a spotlight on a burgeoning game of Internet cat and mouse.

In the case of China, Beijing’s increasing aggressiveness (indeed, ham-handedness) and capability to infiltrate the computer networks of key countries is setting off alarms across the security establishment — and rightfully so. Take the U.S.: while modern warfare is increasingly dependent on advanced computers, no country’s armed forces are more reliant in the Digital Age than those of the U.S. This is both a great strength and a damning weakness.

Today, the U.S. Department of Defense uses more than 5 million computers on 100,000 networks at 1,500 sites in 65 countries worldwide. Not surprisingly, potential adversaries have taken note of the U.S.’ slavish dependence on bits and bytes.

In an average year, the Pentagon suffers upwards of 80,000 attempted computer network attacks, including some that have reduced the U.S. military’s operational capabilities.

Also, in the last few years, the U.S. Army’s elite 101st and 82nd Airborne Divisions and 4th Infantry Division have been “hacked.”

While it is difficult to determine the source, according to the Pentagon, most attacks on the U.S. digital Achilles’ heel originate in China, making Beijing’s information warfare (IW) operations an issue we had better pay close attention to.

IW, including network attacks, exploitation and defense, is not a new national security challenge. Cyberwarfare was the rage in the late 1990s, but has faded since 9/11 in comparison to the mammoth matters of Islamic terrorism, Iraq and Afghanistan.

IW appeals to both state and non-state actors, including terrorists, because it is low-cost, can be highly effective and can provide plausible deniability of responsibility due to the ability to route strikes through any number of surrogate servers along the way.

An IW attack can launch degrading viruses, crash networks, corrupt data, collect intelligence and spread misinformation, effectively interfering with command, control, communications, intelligence, navigation, logistics and operations.

Not surprisingly, rising power China is serious about cyberwarfare, making the development of a robust IW capability a top national-security priority. China’s military planners recognize U.S. — and others’ — dependence on computers as a significant vulnerability.

1|2|Next Page>>

SharePrintEmail

Write a Comment

Enter your comments - 3000 characters max

Type in image code

Submit

 Receive China Post promos Respond to this email